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ChinaA destination-based VAT system without a complete export tax rebate is detrimental to a country's exports,
while an increase in the VAT rebate rate helps reduce the negative effects. In this paper, we study the role of
VAT rebates in affecting Chinese exports using firm-level panel data for 2000–2006. To address potential
endogeneity, we rely on a quasi-natural policy experiment in 2004, when the fiscal conditions of local govern-
ments became important in determining the actual VAT rebate rates for exports. The empirical findings demon-
strate significant and large effects of VAT rebates on export volume. On average, for each percentage point
increase in the VAT rebate rate, the amount of exports increased by 13%, which translates into an additional
$4.70 of exports for each $1 of export tax rebates paid.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The spectacular growth in China's international trade since the
1980s has drawnmuch attention to the various trade policies adopted
by the Chinese government (see Eckaus, 2006; Girma et al., 2009, for
example). We study the effects of one policy instrument used frequently
in recent years, i.e., value-added tax (VAT) rebates. Using firm-level
panel data from the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics
collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS data) for
2000–2006, we present empirical evidence that suggests VAT rebates
have a large and significant positive impact on Chinese export growth.
VAT is an indirect tax imposed at each stage of the production
process based on the amount of value added at that stage. As it is an
indirect tax similar to sales tax, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
allows its member countries to return, up to the full amount, the VAT
levied on their exported goods (Schenk and Oldman, 2007). Thus, VAT
rebates are often referred to as export tax rebates, and we will use these
two terms interchangeably. Note that in contrast to export subsidies
and other measures that affect export performance, VAT rebates are aand Xuepeng Liu, Lu Yi, Devesh
r comments and feedback on a
r James Hines and two anony-
ality of the paper, are greatly
undation of China for financial
missions are ours.
rights reserved.policy sanctioned by the WTO. The WTO rule regarding VAT rebates is
consistent with the organization's main function of ensuring free and
smooth trade, as trade theory implies that a destination-based VAT sys-
tem with a complete export tax rebate has neutral effects on exports
and imports (Feldstein and Krugman, 1990).
Feldstein and Krugman (1990) also show that a VAT systemwhere
exports do not receive complete rebates tends to act as an export tax
and hence reduces trade volume, which then implies a positive rela-
tionship between the VAT rebate rate and export volume, taking as
given the domestic VAT rate. We intend to directly explore whether
export tax rebates help a country's exports to recover from the nega-
tive impact of VAT, and if so, how important the effect is in influencing
export volume. In particular, we analyze the Chinese case using firm-
level panel data from the NBS for 2000–2006. To preview our results,
the findings show that VAT rebates, indeed, have a large and significant
positive impact on the volume of Chinese exports. Specifically, for each
percentage point of increase in the VAT rebate rate, the amount of ex-
ports increases on average by 13%, which translates into an additional
$4.70 of exports for each $1 of export tax rebates.
As with evaluations of any policy instruments, the possible
endogeneity is a concern. For example, other trade promotion mea-
sures, which are often unobserved by the researcher, may be in place
at the same time as an increase in export tax rebate rates. In addition,
as different rebate rates are set for different commodities by govern-
ment officials with an incentive to showcase the effectiveness of their
policies, rebate rates may be set higher for commodities with a greater
1 According to Article 1.1(a) of the WTO SCM agreement, “government revenue that
is otherwise due is foregone or not collected” constitutes a subsidy. It, however, notes
that the “exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like
product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or
taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to
be a subsidy.”
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analysis may over-estimate the effects of tax rebates on exports.
To address this issue, we use instrumental variable estimation, re-
lying on a quasi-natural experiment in China between 2004 and 2006.
During this period, fiscal pressure forced the Chinese government to
adjust export tax rebate rates and to switch part of the fiscal burden
for paying such rebates from the central government to the local
governments. In turn, heterogeneous fiscal conditions across localities
led to substantial variations in the actual rates of VAT rebates received
by exporters in different regions. As local fiscal conditions are, to a
large degree, independent of local export performance, they can serve
as an instrument in our study of how VAT rebates affect exports.
Our paper's contribution to the general literature is, thus, to pro-
vide empirical evidence for the trade theory linking VAT, VAT rebates,
and trade volume. To our knowledge, there have been no empirical
studies that directly explore howVAT rebates affect tradeflows, although
existing empirical studies tend to provide indirect support for the the-
oretical predictions. Desai and Hines (2005) find that for a group of
countries including both developing and advanced economies, both
the VAT dummy and a country's reliance on VAT revenue are signifi-
cantly and negatively associated with the economy's trade intensity
as well as with its export share. Keen and Syed (2006) discover that
for OECD countries from1967 to 2003, an increased reliance of a country
on VAT revenue tends to be associated with a sharp reduction in its net
exports, although the effect quickly fades.
The discrepancy between the neutral effect of VAT on exports pos-
tulated by trade theory and the negative findings in above studies may
be due to the violation in reality of one or more assumptions made in
the theoretical models, including fully flexible exchange rates, uniform
VAT rates across tradable and non-tradable commodities, aswell as per-
fect refunds of VAT paid on inputs used by exporters (Desai and Hines,
2005; Keen and Syed, 2006). To the extent that imperfect refunds of
VAT are prevalent in reality, the above findings are consistent with
the theoretical prediction that the VAT systemwith incomplete rebates
for exports reduces trade volume.
In the context of China, our research relates most closely to the few
papers that study the role of export tax rebates (Chao et al., 2001, 2006;
Chen et al., 2006). These earlier studies either rely on the CGE frame-
work or use national-level time series data, and they tend to find a pos-
itive impact of VAT rebates on trade volume. In contrast, the current
paper utilizes a rich firm-level panel data set, which allows us to control
for various other confounding factors.More generally, our paper follows
the line of research about howChina has obtained its fast export growth
(Branstetter and Feenstra, 2002; Eckaus, 2006; Wang and Wei, 2010;
Schott, 2008; Girma et al., 2009). By exploring the effectiveness of one
specificWTO-sanctionedmeasure, this study adds to the small literature
on the effectiveness of various trade policies (Balassa, 1978; Bernard
and Jensen, 2004; Görg et al., 2008). Finally, our use of firm-level data
furthers the research agenda of firm heterogeneity's role in explaining
trade.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 overviews the
theoretical results relating VAT and its rebate rate to exports, and pro-
vides background information on the VAT rebate program in China.
The endogeneity concern in estimating the impact of VAT rebates
on exports and the fitness of local fiscal conditions as an instrument,
as well as various data and measurement issues, are discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the estimation specifications and dis-
cusses the empirical results, while a short conclusion in Section 5
completes the text.
2. VAT, export tax rebates, and trade: theory and the
China experience
In this section, we first overview theoretical results relating VAT
and export tax rebates to exports, and then provide background infor-
mation on China's VAT rebate program.2.1. VAT, export tax rebates, and export: theory
The value-added tax, or VAT, is a general, broad-based consumption
tax that is assessed on the incremental value added to goods and ser-
vices at each phase of production. In the nations that use a VAT system,
including China, it applies more or less to all goods and services that are
bought or sold for use or consumption. As of January 2007, at least 150
nations use aVAT regime (Bird andGendron, 2007). TheWTOAgreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM, Article 1.1a) allows
members to provide rebates on export duties as long as the rebate
does not exceed the full extent of the duty imposed.1 Thus, in contrast
to other trade policies such as export subsidies, VAT rebates are sanc-
tioned by the WTO.
How does value-added tax affect trade? In the Feldstein and
Krugman (1990) framework, the idealized VAT system has no effect
on a country's exports or imports (often referred to as the neutrality
or irrelevancy result). However, three conditions are essential to obtain
this result in their model: (1) The country is a price-taker on the world
goods market; (2) A uniform VAT rate applies to both tradable goods
and non-tradable goods; and; (3) It is a destination-based VAT, i.e.,
with VAT imposed on imports and full VAT rebates given to exports.
The logic is that a uniform VAT rate on all commodities has the same
effect as an across-the-board price increase of the same proportion in
the host country; that iswhy the domestic price ratios between imports,
exports, and non-traded goods all remain unchanged and so does the
country's competitiveness in international trade. In addition, the full
amount of border adjustments in VAT for both exports and imports
implies that the neutrality result does not require either price flexibility
or exchange rate adjustment. This is because the full VAT rebate for ex-
ports allows their prices to equalize to those on theworldmarket when
sold abroad. Similarly, the domestic prices for imports increase by the
same proportion as all other goods sold at home after VAT is imposed
at the border on imported commodities.
As long as domestic prices or exchange rates are flexible, the neu-
trality result also applies for VAT calculated on an origin basis, where
no VAT is collected on imports and no VAT rebates are given to exports.
In particular, for consumer prices of exports and imports to remain
unchanged (as they are determined on theworldmarket), their domes-
tic producer prices will have to fall in proportion to the VAT rate. Alter-
natively, a currency depreciation in the VAT country in proportion to
the VAT rate will also allow the neutrality result to hold. The additional
requirement of price or exchange rate flexibility may explain why a
destination-based VAT is preferred in practice to an origin-based VAT.
Now consider the following arrangement observed in the real world:
Some countries apply a destination-based VAT without an export tax
rebate or without a complete export tax rebate as in the case of China.
In such cases, the domestic consumer price for exported goods is equal
to the world price (or slightly higher than the world price in the in-
complete rebate case), whereas the consumer prices of imports and
non-traded goods rise in proportion to the VAT rate. Hence, exports
become cheaper relative to other commodities. This implies lower
profit for exporters and thus leads to a lower level of exports, at least
in the short run. Consequently, if VAT rebates are granted or increased,
the export level will rise. Theoretically, a full VAT rebate on exports
will move exports back to the original higher level seen in the absence
of a VAT.
The puzzle then is why a country will ever adopt a destination-
based VATwithout a complete export tax rebate, as such a system clearly











Data sources: Financial Yearbook of China, 1985-2010 














Fig. 1. Export tax rebates/total tax revenue: 1985–2007.
Data sources: Financial Yearbook of China, 1985–2010.
3 As there were not uniform VATs levied on Chinese firms until 1994, it is difficult to
15P. Chandra, C. Long / Journal of Public Economics 102 (2013) 13–22explanation is the concern with government fiscal conditions. As the
financial burden can be quite substantial to refund the full amount of
VAT payments collected on exported goods, the government may have
to lower the export tax rebate rates at times of grave fiscal pressure.
A case in point is China, where a complete rebate (of 17%) was
granted to exported goods when the country first introduced VAT as
the main component of its new tax system in 1994. But within two
years, the fiscal burden of export tax refund had become so high that
the government was forced to reduce the rebate rate from 17% to a
set of lower rates (3%, 6%, and 9% for different groups of commodities).
The VAT rebates on exports have since remained incomplete for most
commodities in China, although the rebate rates have been adjusted
over the years. In times when export conditions deteriorated, the gov-
ernment raised the VAT rebate rates to help alleviate the difficulties;
while in times with tight budgets, the rebate rates were lowered to
ease the fiscal pressure on the government.
Fig. 1 illustrates the magnitude of the export tax rebate program
in China between 1985 and 2007, relative to the country's total tax
revenue. As shown in the graph, since 1994 the amount of export
tax rebates as a share of total tax revenue was rarely below 8% and
exceeded 12% in no less than five years. Thus, export tax rebates have
remained a significant expenditure item for the Chinese government.
The brief history of Chinese VAT rebates in the next section provides
further evidence that fiscal conditions are often instrumental in deter-
mining VAT rebate rates, at least in the case of China.
2.2. VAT rebates in China: a brief history
Export tax rebates were first used in China in 1985. As value-
added taxes were not yet uniformly adopted at the time, rebates
were initially based on sales tax payments. Mainly due to the modest
export volume, the total amount of export tax rebates started small, at
less than 1.8 billion RMB in 1985, amounting to about 0.88% of total tax
revenue. By 2007, the total amount of VAT rebates paid to Chinese
exporters rose to over 560 billion RMB; and the ratio between export
tax rebates and total tax revenue increased to 12.35%, a fourteen-fold
increase since 1985 (see Fig. 1).2 The magnitude of the rebate program
has grown substantially over time, often leading to fiscal stress for the
Chinese central government, the entity that was solely responsible for
paying such rebates until 2004.
Another pattern related to VAT rebates in China is the relatively
high frequency with which the rebate rates have been adjusted. In2 As a share of total turnover tax (which includes value-added tax, business tax, con-
sumption tax, and tariffs), export tax rebates increased from 1.85% to 18.53% during
the same time period, a ten-fold increase.addition, the program seems effective in achieving the intended goals
as higher export tax rebate rates are usually correlatedwith subsequent
higher export growth. A short history of Chinese export tax rebates
since 1994 helps to substantiate this point.
When China reformed its tax system in 1994, VAT was chosen to
be the main component of the new tax system, which henceforth pro-
vided the basis for export tax rebates. The VAT rate was set at 17% for
most commodities produced in China throughout the post-1994 period,
including for all manufactured goods studied in this paper. Following
the principle of full refund of VAT levied on exports in destination-
based VAT, the export tax rebate rates were initially set to equal the
VAT rate, resulting in an average actual rebate rate of 16.63% in 1994.
Many commentators argue that the large increase in the rebate rate
(a 50% rise from around 11% in 1993 to close to 17% in 1994) can largely
explain the growth rate of 32% and 23% in Chinese exports in 1994 and
1995, respectively.3
Subsequently, the rapid growth in exports, coupledwith a less-than-
perfect auditing system in the early stage of the export tax rebate pro-
gram, quickly resulted in a large VAT rebate backlog in 1995, just one
year into the new rebate program. By 1996, the fiscal burden became
so heavy that the government was forced to reduce the rebate rates
from 17% to a set of much lower rates (3%, 6%, and 9% for different
groups of commodities).
Since then, the export tax rebate rates have been adjusted multiple
times, sometimes in response to export conditions and sometimes due
to fiscal constraints. To counter the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and
the subsequent difficulties faced by Chinese exporters, the low export
tax rebate rates of 1996 were dropped and replaced in 1998 by a set
of higher rebate rates of 5%, 13%, 15%, and 17% depending on the cate-
gory of goods. Here again the high growth of exports between 2000
and 2003 led to a large backlog of rebate payments and severe fiscal
pressure on the central government. In response, the rebate rates
were lowered again in 2004 to 5%, 8%, 11%, 13%, and 17% depending
on the product category.4 These rates remained in force until 2006,
the end of the time period studied in this paper.
Based on the theoretical discussion in Section 2.1, a VAT of 17%
together with a rebate of say 13% is equivalent to an origin-based
value-added tax of 13% plus an export tax of 4%. This arrangement
obviously discriminates against the export sector with the degree of
discrimination increasing with the export tax rate and decreasing
with the VAT rebate rate. Fig. 2 provides some preliminary evidence
in support of this observation by linking the timing of rebate rate
adjustments to the surge or slow-down in Chinese exports during
1993–2007. The graph shows that the rebate rate increase in 1994
was followed by fast export growth in 1994 and 1995, while the drop
in rebate rates in 1996 was followed by a decline in export growth in
the same year. Similarly, the rebate rate rise in 1998 preceded fast ex-
port growth until 2004,when the rebate rateswere again lowered. The
lower rebate rates in turn prompted a reduction in export growth rate
starting in 2005.
In summary, VAT rebates in China have absorbed substantial
government financial resources since their formal implementation
in 1994. Furthermore, there is suggestive evidence that export tax
rebate rates are positively correlated with Chinese export growth in
the past decade and a half. In the remainder of this paper, we use
firm-level panel data from China to formally study howmuch a country
with VAT system can influence its export level by adjusting the exportassess and compare the export tax rebate rates prior to 1994 with the rates in later
years. Yet, Mr. Guoqiang Long, a former vice minister of the MOFTEC (Ministry of For-
eign Trade and Economic Cooperation of China) was quoted in 2003 giving an approx-
imate average export tax rebate rate of 11.2% by 1993 (Long, 2003).
4 The other element of the 2004export tax rebate reform, thepayment sharing arrange-
ment between the central and local governments, will be discussed in Section 3.1.
Data sources:
Statistical Yearbook of China and Finance Yearbook of China, 1992-2008
















Fig. 2. Export tax rebate rates and export growth (1993–2007).
Data sources: Statistical Yearbook of China and Finance Yearbook of China,
1992–2008.
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higher VAT rebate rate should not be mistaken as evidence that the
VAT system itself is trade promoting.5
3. Methodology, data, and measurement
As with most program evaluations, endogeneity is a main concern
in this study. To address this concern, we adopt the instrumental var-
iable approach. Section 3.1 discusses the endogeneity issue in more
detail and describes a quasi-natural experiment in China between 2004
and 2006 to provide some background information and the motivation
for our choice of instruments. Section 3.2 describes the data used in
the analysis, constructs the relevantmeasures, and outlines the estima-
tion strategy.
3.1. Endogeneity and the VAT rebate reform of 2004 as a
natural experiment
The patterns shown in Fig. 2 suggest a positive relationship between
export tax rebates and export performance in China, but are not suffi-
cient to establish causality from rebate rate to exports for the following
reasons. Other factors thatmay also influence exportsmight be present
at the same time as the export tax rebate rate adjustment, including the
macroeconomic conditions of foreign markets and other trade policies
adopted by the Chinese government to facilitate exports (such as
improved customs and transportation services). Thus, the correlation
between VAT rebates and export performance may merely reflect the
effects of these other factors.
There is an additional potential source of endogeneity. As different
export tax rebate rates are assigned to different commodities by trade
officials who have an incentive to showcase the effectiveness of their
policies, they may set higher rebate rates for products with a greater
potential for export growth. Therefore, a simple OLS analysis may fail to
demonstrate causality from tax rebates to exports or may overestimate
the effects of tax rebates on exports.While year fixed effectsmight cap-
ture the time-varying macroeconomic conditions in foreign markets,
and some of the other factors can be controlled for using the available5 Note that export prices are taken as given in the discussion here, implying that we
can discuss the quantity and the value of exports interchangeably. This assumption is
highly applicable for the discussion on manufactured goods exported by China, as it
competes with other low labor cost producers throughout the world. As a result, al-
though the monetary value of exports will be used in our empirical analysis, we believe
the findings will also apply to the quantity of exports.information, others may not be observable to the researchers and are
thus more challenging to address.
Fortunately, the 2004 reform of China's export tax rebate program
offers us an opportunity to address the endogeneity issue. In addition
to lowering rebate rates in response to mounting fiscal pressure dur-
ing 2000–2003, a major change was made in the reform regarding the
roles of central versus local governments in VAT rebates. Prior to
2004, the central government had been solely responsible for paying
VAT rebates to exporters. But since 2004, local governments were re-
quired to share thefinancial burden of refunding the rebates. Specifically,
the central government would continue to refund export tax rebates up
to the actual total amount of rebates paid out in the year 2003 for each
region. For the amount of rebates claimed by local exporters in excess
of the 2003 level, the local government would now have to pay 25%
of it. The remaining 75% of the refundwould still come from the central
government, but only after the fulfillment of the local government's
obligation.
The justification for the 75/25 split is based on the fact that the
VAT revenue on goods and services produced domestically is shared
between the central government and local governments with the same
ratio. Yet this arrangement still has the flavor of an unfunded mandate
because all VAT income from imported goods (including materials or
components that are routinely used in producing exports) belongs to
the central government. The local government thus has likely received
less than 25% of the total VAT income levied on the export goods.
This suggests a strategy for how to address the potential endogeneity
of VAT rebate rates:We can use somemeasure of local fiscal conditions
to instrument the actual rebate rates. This satisfies the relevancy crite-
rion after 2004, as the reform implies that the fiscal conditions of local
governments have since become important in determining the actual
VAT rebate rates in each region. For exports exceeding the previous
year's level, local governments were not only required to pay 25% of
total rebates to exporters located in their own region, but also the pay-
ment of the remaining 75% of the rebate by the central government
was conditioned on the local payment.
Note that, local governments with a large fiscal gap (between their
revenue income and government expenditure) will be less able to fully
fund their share of the export tax rebates, resulting in the further with-
holding of the part owed by the central government. As a result, one ex-
pects to see lower actual export tax rebate rates in regions with higher
deficit rates. Indeed, media reports abound where fiscal conditions had
prevented local governments from paying their 25% share of the export
tax rebates, resulting in local exporters failing to obtain any rebate.6
To satisfy the exclusiveness condition, we carefully choose themea-
sure for the local fiscal conditions to best capture the part that is not
directly correlated with the region's export performance. In particular,
for any given Chinese province j in year t of our sample, we evaluate
the region's fiscal conditions using the routine fiscal deficit ratejt which
is constructed from the region's business tax revenue and government
administrative expenditure as follows:
routine fiscal deficit ratejt ¼ government administrativeexpenditurejt–businesstaxjt
 
=government administrative expenditurejt:
Although it is themost important revenue source for the local gov-
ernment, business tax revenue is largely independent of the region's
export volume, as this tax is levied on service firms whereas Chinese
exports are predominantly commodities. On the expenditure side,
government administrative expenditure mainly consists of salaries of
the government employees,which aremainly determined by personnel6 See, for example, “Further Reform Export Rebate Sharing System to Reduce Local
Government Fiscal Burden,” a news report published on China Law Education on August
24, 2006 (accessed on March 4, 2013 at http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/21602/
21661/21670/2006/8/zh8694926561428600210005-0.htm).
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region's export volume.
Admittedly, there may be spillover effects from better export per-
formance on business tax revenue (through increased business and
other expenditures by exporters and their suppliers in service industries,
for example) and government administrative expenditure (probably
through overtime pay for customs staff due to increased exports). How-
ever, we believe these effects are indirect and relatively small, and our
analysis below, based on the NBS data, provides some supportive evi-
dence for this belief.
Specifically, we look at the correlation between the routine fiscal
deficit rate and exports at the provincial level for two separate periods:
2004–2006, the period after theVAT rebate reform; and 2000–2002, the
years prior to the reform.7While the correlationwas only−0.14 for the
earlier period, it increased in magnitude to −0.41 for the later period.
As discussed previously, the difference between the two periods is
mainly caused by the VAT rebate reform, which requires local govern-
ments to be partially responsible for refunding VAT rebates and, thus,
establishes a link between local fiscal conditions and local export per-
formance through VAT rebate rates. These results thus offer some sup-
port that the spillover effects of exports on the routine fiscal deficit rate
are relatively small and indirect.
In addition, we compute and compare the correlation coefficient
between the routine fiscal deficit rate and the export tax rebate rates
for the two time periods (i.e., 2000–2002 and 2004–2006). While the
correlation is insignificant for the earlier period, it is negative and sig-
nificant for the later period with a value of −0.32. These results are
consistent with the argument that local fiscal conditions play a bigger
role in determining export tax rebate rates since 2004, thus providing
support for our choice of instrumental variable. Hence, there is sugges-
tive evidence that estimates using this instrumentmay not suffer signif-
icantly from violations of the exclusion restriction, even if the exclusion
restriction is not strictly valid.3.2. Data and measurement
We now implement the instrumental variable approach outlined
in Section 3.1 using the NBS data. The NBS dataset includes all state
owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as all other manufacturing firms
with an annual turnover of more than 5 million RMBs. Typically, the
firms included in the dataset account for about 85%–90% of the total
industrial output of China (Girma et al., 2009).8 As discussed previously,
our estimation strategy relies on the quasi-natural experiment that
started in 2004. Thus, we use the NBS firm level panel data for the
2004–2006 period in our main specifications. We also use the NBS
data from the earlier period (2000–2002) to compare and test the
robustness of our main results.
As the recent trade literature highlights the role of firms in trade,
we conduct our analysis at the firm level (Bernard and Jensen, 2004;
Bernard et al., 2007; Melitz, 2003). Moreover, using the firm-level
panel allows us to control for various firm-specific characteristics
(including size, capital intensity, productivity, aswell as other unobserved
time-invariant firm characteristics), which are believed to be important
for making export decisions, according to the literature. Nevertheless,7 To avoid complications due to the different rebate rates imposed on different com-
modity groups, the analysis on how VAT rebate rates relate to regional deficit rates or
exports is conducted separately for individual industries. The discussion here is based
on analysis of the Chinese electronics and communication industry, which is the larg-
est industry in terms of both export value as well as the total output for each year in
our sample. Analysis based on several other leading industries, such as chemicals or
machinery, gives similar results.
8 Some Chinese firms export through intermediaries or trading firms, and these
trading firms accounted for about 20% of the total exports in China in 2005 (Ahn et
al., 2011). As export tax rebates are only given to firms that directly sell to foreign mar-
kets, and our data set does not include trading companies, we cannot study the effects
of export tax rebate rates on trading intermediaries.while we conduct our analysis at the firm level, our main variable of in-
terest varies at a higher level of aggregation. Specifically, for the reasons
discussed below, we use the NBS firm-level panel data to construct
aggregate measures for VAT rebate rates for each province-industry
pair. The provincial level is chosen because provinces are the top level
of local governments in China, which are ultimately in charge of all tax
collection at the local level. The data source for variables at the provin-
cial level, including those used to measure local fiscal conditions, is
the China Statistical Yearbooks for 2000–2006.
Our main variable of interest is the VAT rebate rate. However, two
decisions need to be made regarding its measurement. The first is the
choice between using the rebate rates stipulated by law (de jure rates)
and using the observed actual rebate rates (de facto rates). We choose
to use the de facto rates for two reasons: The de facto rates often differ
substantially from the de jure rates due to different fiscal constraints
faced by local governments, which is the key to our identification
strategy. Just as importantly, it is the actual rebate rates that provide
the ultimate incentive for exporters.
Since the VAT rate for industrial products is set at a uniform rate
of 17%, the legal rule applicable for computing VAT payable for firm
k in year t of our sample is as follows9:
VAT payablekt ¼ ValueAddedkt  17%  exportkt  VAT rebateratekt
¼ revenuekt–throughputktð Þ  17%  exportkt  VAT rebateratekt
¼ revenuekt  17%  VAT onthroughputkt
exportkt  VAT rebateratekt :
ð1Þ10
Therefore, we use the following formula in constructing the de facto
firm-level VAT rebate rates, where all the variables on the right-hand-
side are available from the NBS data set at the firm level:
actualVAT rebateratekt¼ 0:17  revenuekt−VAT onthroughputkt−VAT payablektð Þ
=exportkt if exportkt > 0: ð2Þ
An advantage of focusing on the rebate rate instead of the total
value of rebate received by the firm is that our analysis does not suffer
from the endogeneity concern due to the automatic correlation between
the VAT rebate amount and export volume. Moreover, as shown in
Eq. (2), the VAT rebate rate is defined only for firmswith positive exports.
Since imputing a zero rebate rate for non-exporters would introduce an
artificial positive correlation between the rebate rate and export volume,
we focus only on exporters to avoid the potential upward bias in the
estimates.
The second decision to be made relates to the level of aggregation
at which VAT rebate rates should be measured. On the one hand, the
actual VAT rebate rates may differ at the firm level for various reasons,
thus calling for measuring the rebate rate for each firm individually.
For instance, in addition to the variation in actual rebate rates that
firms in different provinces receive due to heterogeneous local fiscal
conditions, the actual rebate rates for firms within the same province
may also differ if the firms export different commodities, which may
have different de jure rebate rates. Furthermore, firms may differ in
their abilities in claiming rebates, either due to differences in their
staff's technical skills to navigate the VAT rebate process or due to
their different political connections with the relevant tax agency. This9 See Circular No. 7 (2002) for the accounting rules governing value-added taxes and
export tax rebates in China.
10 The original formula for computing VAT payable for the exporting firms is: VAT
payablekt = Domestic Saleskt ∗ 17%-Domestic Inputkt ∗ 17% + (exportkt-BIMkt) ∗ (17%-
Rebate Ratekt), where BIMkt is the value of bonded imported raw materials. In the for-
mula given in the text, we have assumed BIMkt = 0 and total inputkt = domestic inputkt
for simplicity, consistent with the approach taken in other recent papers (see, for
example, Liu, 2010). In the empirical section we show that our results are robust to the
exclusion of firms for which these assumptions are most likely to be violated, i.e., export
processing firms and foreign invested firms.
Table 1
Summary statistics of main variables, 2000–2006.
Data sources: All variables are obtained from the NBS industrial census data for 2000–2006, except the per capita GDP and the routine fiscal deficit rate at the provincial level which
are from the China Statistical Yearbooks for 2000–2006. We exclude the top and bottom 1% of observations in the calculated rebate rate to avoid the potential impact of influential
outliers. The average VAT rebate rate is obtained after averaging the firm-level rebate rate over province and 2-digit Chinese industry pairs.
Panel A: VAT rebate rate, 2000–2006
Variable Firm-level VAT rebate rate Average VAT rebate rate
N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev.
Years (2000–2002) 114,782 0.0634 0.1396 121,456 0.0880 0.0579
Years (2004–2006) 242,022 0.0809 0.1628 257,033 0.1145 0.0787
2000 31,218 0.0628 0.1425 33,257 0.0858 0.0616
2001 42,759 0.0586 0.1370 45,036 0.0813 0.0565
2002 40,805 0.0689 0.1399 43,163 0.0967 0.0553
2004 78,590 0.0775 0.1458 82,267 0.1093 0.0587
2005 83,728 0.0839 0.1733 89,766 0.1182 0.0900
2006 79,704 0.0811 0.1670 85,000 0.1155 0.0825
Panel B: other variables, 2000–2002 vs. 2004–2006
Variable 2000–2002 2004–2006
N Mean Std. Dev N Mean Std. Dev.
Firm-level
ln(export) 121,456 6.9135 4.3679 257,033 7.2963 4.2815
ln(labor productivity) 121,456 3.3747 1.1894 257,033 3.8185 1.1434
ln(employment) 121,456 5.3634 1.1863 257,033 5.1391 1.1376
ln(asset/employment) 121,456 3.4790 1.3862 257,033 3.5287 1.3798
number of firms 47,488 – – 93,800 – –
Province-level
routine fiscal deficit rate 93 −0.6369 1.5407 93 −0.6576 1.4861
per capita GDP (RMB) 93 9429.81 7166.57 93 16,314.73 11,347.18
Notes.
The formulae for computing the variables are as follows:
actualVAT rebateratekt ¼ 0:17  revenuekt−VAT onthroughputkt−VAT payablektð Þ=exportkt ; if exportkt > 0for firmk inyear t; and; routine fiscaldeficit ratejt
¼ government administrativeexpenditurejt–business taxjt
 
=government administrativeexpenditurejt foraChineseprovince j inyear t:
18 P. Chandra, C. Long / Journal of Public Economics 102 (2013) 13–22suggests that one should exploit the variations across firms in their de
facto rebate rates.
On the other hand, firms contemplating whether and how much to
export are more likely to base their decisions on the average expected
rebate rates for other firms producing similar goods in their region,
especially if they have not been exporting in recent years. In addition,
while there is a potential for measurement errors in calculating the
firm-level actual VAT rebate rate using Eq. (2) (for instance, due to
the lags in rebate payments), the problem may be mitigated when
rebate rates are averaged across firms. Hence, these reasons argue
for using an average VAT rebate rate across similar firms.
To the extent that new entrants to the export market are impor-
tant and that measurement errors in rebate rates are of a concern at
the firm level, we choose to measure the rebate rates as an average
in our main specifications. Specifically, we first compute the VAT re-
bate rate for each firm in each year, and then compute the average
rebate rate for all firms of the same industry that are located in the
same province, where we define industry using the 2-digit Chinese
industry classification (CIC).11 Note that we calculate the average
across all firms in an industry-province pair rather than computing the
average across all firms in that province because different product
groups have different de jure rebate rates. In addition, to check the11 While we calculate and report the results using the simple average of the firm-level
VAT rebates, most of our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we compute a
weighted average of the firm-level VAT rebate rates using either the output or the value
added of the firms as weights. These results are available on request.robustness of our results while exploiting firm-level variations, we
also use de facto firm-level rebate rates in some of the specifications.
We report the summary statistics of the actual rebate rates received
by firms in Panel A of Table 1. The columns on the left report the sum-
mary statistics for firm-level VAT rebate rates calculated using Eq. (2),
whereas, the columns on the right report similar statistics for the aver-
age rebate rate as described above. As expected, the average rebate rate
is slightly higher in magnitude but has a lower variance for any given
year in the sample, compared to thefirm-level rebate rates. Nevertheless,
both measures show a similar trend in the VAT rebate rates, which is
largely in line with the changes over time as portrayed in Fig. 2, with a
lag of a year or two. For example, the observed de facto VAT rebate rate
started to rise in 2002, one year after the de jure VAT rebate rate rose
in 2001; and started to decline in 2006, two years after the 2004 export
tax rebate reforms. The time lag in the de facto VAT rebate rate relative
to the de jure VAT rebate rate ismost likely due to delays in rebate pay-
ments. Moreover, the average rebate rate in Table 1 is similar in mag-
nitude to that given in Fig. 2. Most importantly, Table 1 shows larger
variances in the later time period, consistent with our hypothesis
that the VAT reform of 2004 led to increased differences in the de
facto rates across provinces.
Panel B of Table 1 gives information on the other variables used in the
empirical analysis. Compared to the earlier time period (2000–2002),
Chinese firms exported more, had higher labor productivity, and had
higher capital intensity, but employed fewer people in the later period
(2004–2006). However, none of these differences are statistically sig-
nificant. Similarly, while the average provincial per capita GDP has
roughly doubled, there is no significant change in the provincial rou-
tine fiscal deficit rate between the two periods. The average provincial
deficit rate is around −0.6, implying that, on average, the amount of
19P. Chandra, C. Long / Journal of Public Economics 102 (2013) 13–22revenue provincial governments received from business taxes was
much more than their administrative expenditure.12 Finally, we see
that around 18% of tax revenue at the provincial level comes from
the value-added tax.
4. Estimation specification and empirical results
To empirically study the effects of VAT rebate rates on firm export




¼ αk þ αt þ β1  averageVAT rebaterateijt þ Г  Xkijt
þ εkijt ; ð3Þ
where log(exportkijt) is the logarithm of firm k's export level in year t,
average VAT rebate rateijt is the average rebate rate in year t for all firms
located in industry i and province j, Xkijt is a vector of firm-level control
variables, while εkijt is the random noise variable. For firm-level char-
acteristics, we include the usual controls for explaining export — the
logarithms of labor productivity, employment, and capital intensity.
To account for potential effects of region's income level on exports, we
also include provincial per capita GDP. Finally, firm fixed effects are
included to control for unobserved firm characteristics that are time
invariant, and year dummies are included to address common trends
over time such as macro policy shocks, both domestically and abroad.
The variable of interest is average VAT rebate rateijt, andwe expect its
coefficient to be positive and significant. As discussed in Section 3.1, to
address the potential endogeneity of average VAT rebate rate, we rely
on a two-stage least squares estimation with an instrumental variable,
routine fiscal deficit rate.We expect a negative correlation between routine
fiscal deficit rate and average VAT rebate rate in the first stage estimations.
As discussed in Section 3.1, local fiscal conditions became a good
instrument for actual export tax rebate rates since 2004 because of
the quasi-natural experiment conducted in that year. Thus, we mainly
investigate data for the 2004–2006 period in the empirical analysis,
but also use the data for the earlier years as a counterfactual test. Our
analysis in the main specification focuses on the sample of firms that
exported at least once during the 2000–2006 period as these firms are
the main policy target of VAT rebate rate adjustments. In addition, we
use other sub-samples to test the robustness of our results.
Table 2 gives the main results from our empirical analysis, where
Columns 1 and 2 provide the OLS estimates as the benchmark results,
with robust standard errors clustered at the province-2-digit CIC level
and the firm level, respectively.13 The OLS estimates are in line with
the expectation that a higher export tax rebate rate is correlated
with a higher export volume, as the coefficient of average VAT rebate
rate (averaged at the province-2-digit CIC level) is positive and signif-
icant in both estimations.
However, as discussed in Section 3.1, these results may suffer from
potential endogeneity. We address this issue in Columns 3 and 4 by
using IV estimation, where a measure for local fiscal conditions, the
routine fiscal deficit rate, is used as an instrument for the average
VAT rebate rate. As shown in Table 2, the IV estimation produces sig-
nificant and positive coefficients for the VAT rebate rate, regardless
of whether the standard errors are clustered at the province-2-digit
CIC level (Column 3) or at the firm level (Column 4).12 This, however, does not imply that local governments did not face financial con-
straints during these years, because they also faced other fiscal obligations.
13 The clustering of standard errors is needed because the VAT rebate rate is averaged
at the province-2-digit CIC level and because random errors from different years may
be correlated for the same firm. As is well known, in the presence of a group-level ex-
planatory variable, one should account for the possible correlation within the group to
avoid inconsistent standard errors (see for instance, Moulton, 1990; Wooldridge,
2003). Hence, we use clustering at the province-2-digit CIC level. On the other hand,
Bertrand et al. (2004) and Stock and Watson (2008) strongly recommend that one
should control for unit-level autocorrelations when using panel data. Hence, we also
report our results with standard errors clustered at the firm level.The estimated coefficients imply that the effect of VAT rebates on
exports is also economically important. Based on the results from
Column 3 of Table 2, a one percentage point increase in the VAT rebate
rate will result in an increase of about 13% in the volume of exports. The
magnitude is very large, amounting tomore than half of China's average
export growth rate in 2000–2006 (at 25%). The magnitude of the IV es-
timate is similar to that of the OLS estimate, suggesting that the various
sources of endogeneity have produced effects that cancel out one another.
Up until now, the average VAT rebate rate is used as the main
explanatory variable. To allow for the possibility that the variations
observed in the firm-level actual VAT rebate rate indicate additional
systematic differences rather than random errors, we replace the
average VAT rates with the firm-level rebate rate in Columns 5 and
6 of Table 2. Again, the standard errors are clustered, either at the
province-2-digit CIC level (Column 5) or at the firm level (Column 6).
We get similar results as those from Columns 3 and 4, except with
smaller magnitudes for the coefficients. This is what one would expect
if the actual VAT rebate rates calculated at the firm level weremore sus-
ceptible to the (classical) measurement error.
To test the validity of our instruments, we report the correspond-
ing first-stage results for Columns 3–6 in the bottom panel of Table 2.
Consistent with the expectation that those local governments with
higher deficit rates are less capable of paying out export tax rebates,
routine fiscal deficit rate has negative and significant effects on actual
rebate rate in the first-stage. Moreover, for each IV specification Table 2
also reports several standard statistical tests that support the validity
of the instrument.
To test the robustness of our main findings, we conduct additional
estimations shown in Table 3, using various samples. All of the spec-
ifications adopt the IV estimation, use average VAT rebate rates, and
report robust standard errors clustered at the province-2-digit CIC
level. Although clustering at either the firm level or the group level
is recommended in the literature (Bertrand et al., 2004; Stock and
Watson, 2008; Wooldridge, 2003), we report the results with standard
errors clustered at the industry–province pair level as this tends to give
more conservative (larger) estimates for standard errors.
In Column 1 of Table 3, we provide additional evidence to confirm
the importance of the quasi-natural experiment in 2004–2006 inmaking
routine fiscal deficit rate a valid instrument for actual rebate rates, by
conducting the same 2SLS estimation as above (see Table 2, Column 3)
for the 2000–2002 data.14 As shown in the bottom panel of Table 3,
routine fiscal deficit rate is insignificant in explaining actual rebate
rate, and other statistical test results also imply that it is not a valid
instrument for the actual rebate rate for the 2000–2002 time period.
Moreover, the coefficient of the VAT rebate rate in the top panel of
Table 3 not only is insignificant but also has the opposite sign, suggesting
that routine fiscal deficit rate is not a valid instrument for the earlier
period. In other words, the quasi-natural experiment in 2004 is, indeed,
the key to routine fiscal deficit rate being a valid instrument for actual
rebate rates.
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, we limit our sample to only domestic
firms and non-export-processing firms, respectively, to address two
issues. First, as we assumed the bonded imported materials (BIM) to be
zero in our calculation of the actual export tax rebate rate, it introduces
a larger measurement error for foreign firms and export-processing
firms, the most common users of BIM.15 In addition, as foreign firms
and export-processingfirms enjoy other preferential treatment, including
more streamlined customs procedures, we expect them to experience
effects of the VAT rebates that may be different from those on domestic
firms.14 We do not use data from 2003 as exporters may have behaved differently due to
the large backlogs of VAT rebate refunds that year.
15 See Footnote 10 for the formula referring to BIM. In addition, we define export-
processing firms to be those firms that exported more than 90% of their total output.
16 For a detailed discussion on the most common types of export tax frauds, see
“Frauds within Frauds: the Case of Baoxiang Hebei Import–export Group Tax Fraud,”
a report published by Xinhua News on July 24, 2003 (accessed at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-07/24/content_992341.htm on March 4, 2013).
Table 2
VAT rebate rates and Chinese export volume, 2004–2006 (main results).
Data sources: All variables are obtained from the NBS data for 2004–2006, except for provincial GDP per capita and routine fiscal deficit rate, which are from the China Statistical
Yearbooks for 2004–2006.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VAT rebate rate 12.8717⁎⁎⁎ 12.8717⁎⁎⁎ 13.0585⁎⁎ 13.0585⁎⁎⁎ 9.6337⁎ 9.6337⁎⁎⁎
(1.4231) (0.2627) (5.9794) (2.3421) (5.4349) (2.6201)
ln(labor productivity) 0.2698⁎⁎⁎ 0.2698⁎⁎⁎ 0.2692⁎⁎⁎ 0.2692⁎⁎⁎ 0.1549⁎⁎ 0.1549⁎⁎⁎
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0222) (0.0148) (0.0669) (0.0343)
ln(employment) 1.2660⁎⁎⁎ 1.2660⁎⁎⁎ 1.2646⁎⁎⁎ 1.2646⁎⁎⁎ 1.0357⁎⁎⁎ 1.0357⁎⁎⁎
(0.0440) (0.0392) (0.0496) (0.0354) (0.1214) (0.0653)
ln(assets/employment) 0.1982⁎⁎⁎ 0.1982⁎⁎⁎ 0.1976⁎⁎⁎ 0.1976⁎⁎⁎ 0.1472⁎⁎⁎ 0.1472⁎⁎⁎
(0.0248) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0203) (0.0335) (0.0245)
Provincial per capita GDP −0.0001⁎⁎ −0.0001⁎⁎⁎ −0.0001⁎⁎ −0.0001⁎⁎⁎ −0.0000 −0.0000⁎⁎⁎
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant −1.1973⁎⁎ −1.1973⁎⁎⁎
(0.5649) (0.3043)
Number of observations 257,033 257,033 257,033 257,033 238,454 238,454
Number of firms 93,799 93,799 93,800 93,800 89,016 89,016
R-squared (within) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09
First stage F-stat – – 959.95 959.95 64.13 64.13
Under identification test – – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weak instrument test – – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corresponding first stage regressions –
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable (average VAT rebate rate)
ln(labor productivity) 0.0035⁎⁎⁎ 0.0035⁎⁎⁎ 0.0122⁎⁎⁎ 0.0122⁎⁎⁎
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005)
ln(employment) 0.0071⁎⁎⁎ 0.0071⁎⁎⁎ 0.0217⁎⁎⁎ 0.0217⁎⁎⁎
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0013)
ln(assets/employment) 0.0029⁎⁎⁎ 0.0029⁎⁎⁎ 0.0058⁎⁎⁎ 0.0058⁎⁎⁎
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Provincial per capita GDP −0.0000⁎⁎⁎ −0.0000⁎⁎⁎ −0.0000⁎⁎⁎ −0.0000⁎⁎⁎
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Routine fiscal deficit rate −0.0236⁎⁎⁎ −0.0236⁎⁎⁎ −0.0211⁎⁎⁎ −0.0211⁎⁎⁎
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Number of observations 257,033 257,033 238,454 238,454
Number of firms 93,800 93,800 89,016 89,016
R-squared (within) 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01
Notes.
1. The dependent variable is ln(exports). All specifications report cluster-robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in Columns 1, 3, and 5, and at the province-2-digit CIC
level in Columns 2, 4, and 6;
2. OLS estimation is used in Columns 1 and 2, while IV estimation is used in all other columns using local fiscal conditions as instruments;
3. For Columns 1–4, VAT rebate rate is computed as the average for all exporting firms in the same province and the same 2-digit CIC industry in each year, while Columns 5 and 6
use the firm-level VAT rebate rate;
4. Samples in all the columns include the 2004–2006 observations of firms that had exported at least once in the 2000–2006 period;
5. The under-identification test statistic reported is Kleibergen–Paap test statistic, which is more suitable when the errors are correlated or the i.i.d. assumption fails. The weak
instrument test is the Anderson-Rubin Wald test.
⁎ Significant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
20 P. Chandra, C. Long / Journal of Public Economics 102 (2013) 13–22Reassuringly, the VAT rebate rate continues to have a positive and
significant impact on the export volumes of both domestic firms and
non-export-processors. Furthermore, the effects are of a larger mag-
nitude for these firms as compared to those for the whole sample of
firms. This is consistent with our expectations, because domestic firms
and regular exporters are more likely to benefit from VAT rebates. In
contrast, even without VAT rebates, foreign-invested firms and export-
processingfirms already enjoy import duty drawbacks,which are equiv-
alent to a complete waiver on the VAT for their imported inputs, and
thus these firms should benefit less from export tax rebates.
Finally, we address the potential impact of export over-reporting
or VAT rebate fraud in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3. For example, there
may be incentives for firms to over-report their export figures; such
incentives are stronger in regions and sectors where the rebate rates
are higher. In addition, firms could systematically shift the timing of
when they export to benefit more from the VAT rebate program.
To partially evaluate the impact of these behaviors, we exclude
firms in the apparel and electronics industries from our sample inColumn 4, since they are the prime targets for export tax rebate
fraud.16 The incentive for over-reporting is greater for these two
types of products because apparel products and electronic products
tend to have higher rebate rates than other products. In addition,
apparel products are used in export tax rebate fraud more than other
goods because the probability of detection is relatively low due to
their large export volumes. Similarly, the light weight and high unit
value of electronics make these products an ideal choice for export tax
rebate fraud. Reassuringly, the results show that the VAT rebate rate
still has positive and significant effects on export volumes.
In Column 5 of Table 3, we exclude firms from Guangdong and
Fujian provinces to further address the potential issue of export over-
reporting because these are the two regions that likely suffer the most
Table 3
VAT rebate rates and Chinese export volume (robustness checks).
Data sources: All variables are obtained from the NBS data for 2000–2006, except for provincial GDP per capita and routine fiscal deficit rate, which are from the China Statistical
Yearbooks for 2000–2006.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VAT rebate rate −133.0360 29.9837⁎⁎⁎ 16.7452⁎⁎⁎ 14.3302⁎⁎ 19.1686⁎⁎⁎
(632.4616) (6.1816) (4.5247) (5.5305) (3.6333)
ln(labor productivity) 0.3028 0.1971⁎⁎⁎ 0.3318⁎⁎⁎ 0.2607⁎⁎⁎ 0.2479⁎⁎⁎
(0.26698) (0.0363) (0.0231) (0.0214) (0.0165)
ln(employment) 1.3413⁎ 1.2317⁎⁎⁎ 1.5267⁎⁎⁎ 1.2633⁎⁎⁎ 1.2805⁎⁎⁎
(0. 7752) (0.0807) (0.0606) (0.0514) (0.0474)
ln(asset/employment) 0.3928 0.1882⁎⁎⁎ 0.2987⁎⁎⁎ 0.2128⁎⁎⁎ 0.2369⁎⁎⁎
(0. 6582) (0.0345) (0.0277) (0.0249) (0.0245)
Provincial per capita GDP −0.0006 −0.0000 −0.0001⁎⁎ −0.0001⁎⁎ −0.0001⁎⁎
(0. 0031) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Number of observations 121,456 144,519 167,870 228,931 188,924
Number of firms 47,488 52,993 63,474 83,593 68,922
R-squared (within) 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.06
First stage F-stat 1.05 493.92 952.46 862.24 2442.52
Under identification test 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weak instrument test 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corresponding first stage regressions –
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable (average VAT rebate rate)
ln(labor productivity) 0.0004⁎⁎ 0.0054⁎⁎⁎ 0.0048⁎⁎⁎ 0.0037⁎⁎⁎ 0.0040⁎⁎⁎
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ln(employment) 0.0012⁎⁎ 0.0104⁎⁎⁎ 0.0099⁎⁎⁎ 0.0077⁎⁎⁎ 0.0085⁎⁎⁎
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005)
ln(asset/employment) 0.0010⁎⁎⁎ 0.0025⁎⁎⁎ 0.0038⁎⁎⁎ 0.0032⁎⁎⁎ 0.0027⁎⁎⁎
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Provincial per capita GDP −0.0000⁎⁎⁎ −0.0000⁎⁎⁎ −0.0000⁎⁎⁎ −0.0000⁎⁎⁎ −0.0000⁎⁎⁎
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Routine fiscal deficit rate −0.0013 −0.0328⁎⁎⁎ −0.0339⁎⁎⁎ −0.0253⁎⁎⁎ −0.0460⁎⁎⁎
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Number of observations 121,456 144,519 167,870 228,931 188,924
Number of firms 47,488 52,993 63,474 83,593 68,922
R-squared (within) 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07
Notes.
1. The dependent variable is ln(exports). All specifications report cluster-robust standard errors, clustered at the province-2-digit CIC level;
2. IV estimation is used in all columns using local fiscal conditions as instruments;
3. VAT rebate rate is computed as the average for all exporting firms in the same province and the same 2-digit CIC industry in each year;
4. Samples in Columns 1–5 are, respectively, firms that had exported at least once in 2000–2006, only firms with domestic ownership, firms excluding those that only engage in
processing exports, firms that do not operate in electronics or apparel industries, and firms that do not locate in Fujian or Guangdong provinces. Column 1 uses observations for
the 2000–2002 period, whereas Columns 2–6 use observations from the 2004–2006 period.
5. The under-identification test statistic reported is Kleibergen–Paap test statistic, which is more suitable when the errors are correlated or the i.i.d. assumption fails. The weak
instrument test is the Anderson–Rubin Wald test.
⁎ Significant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
21P. Chandra, C. Long / Journal of Public Economics 102 (2013) 13–22rampant VAT rebate fraud cases. These provinceswere hosts to the orig-
inal four Special Economic Zones in China and enjoyed more flexible
customs regulations. In addition, Guangdong province borders Hong
Kong where a common form of VAT rebate fraud, that of first shipping
exports and then smuggling them back into China, allegedly occurs.
Fujian, on the other hand, has the largest number of underground
financial institutions in China, which are often involved in funding
fraudulent activities. Once again, the positive and significant effect of
the VAT rebate rates on export volume remains.17 Note that, there are at least two reasons for finding a lower effect of China's own
tariff liberalization on its exports. Tariff liberalization boosts exports by reducing pro-
tection on the imported intermediate inputs. However, China had already reduced its
tariff barriers significantly through unilateral liberalization prior to its WTO accession.
Moreover, China has followed a policy of duty exemptions that allows a large share of
the intermediate inputs used in the production of exports to be either exempt from im-
port duty or to be eligible for refunds later (Ianchovichina and Martin, 2004).5. Conclusion
Economic theory implies that the adoption of VAT coupled with
imperfect VAT refunds to exporters reduces the country's exports.
Consequently, an increase in VAT rebate rates will partially remedy the
negative impact and lead to a higher level of exports. This hypothesis
is supported by our findings based on firm-level panel data from China's
annual industrial statistics collected by NBS for 2004–2006.Specifically, we find significant and large positive effects of VAT re-
bate rates on the export volume of Chinese firms. For each percentage
point of increase in the average VAT rebate rate expected for similar
firms, a typical Chinese firm's exports will increase by 13%, on average,
which translates into an additional $4.7 of exports for each $1 of export
tax rebates. The estimated effects of VAT rebates are large compared to
the effects of tariff reduction. For example, Tokarick (2007) estimates
that a complete elimination of tariffs in China (then, at an average
level of 12%) during the Doha Roundwould lead to an increase in its ex-
ports of about 19.5%. Similarly, Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) esti-
mated that the WTO accession of China in 2001 and the subsequent
tariff liberalization increased China's exports by about 16.8%.17
22 P. Chandra, C. Long / Journal of Public Economics 102 (2013) 13–22In obtaining these estimates, we exploit the quasi-natural experi-
ment in China whereby both central and the provincial government
started sharing the burden of rebating export taxes. We instrument
the actual VAT rebate rates by the routine fiscal deficit rate at the prov-
ince level to address the issue of potential endogeneity, as the deficit
rate is directly correlated with the actual rebate rate but generally is
not associated with the export performance of local firms. Our results
survive numerous robustness tests and counterfactual exercises.
Two caveats are in order, however. First, as the results are based on
a relatively short panel, the findings may not be used to extrapolate
effects of VAT rebate rates on exports in the longer term. Second, although
the empirical findings are consistent with higher VAT rebates leading
to increased Chinese exports in the past decade, these results do not
speak to the general effectiveness or efficiency of trade policies in
China. In particular, one cannot rule out the possibility that Chinese
export growth could have been higher if China had adopted a different
tax system — for example, a VAT system with automatic complete
border adjustments.
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